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Administrative Law
by Jennifer B. Alewine*
Courtney E. Ferrelland Allison W. Pryor*
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2016 through May 31, 2017 in
which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case. 1
The Article first discusses the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
followed by decisions by state administrative agencies, then on to scope
of authority, statutory construction, a review of administrative decisions,
and concludes with a brief review of enactments from the 2017 regular
session of the Georgia General Assembly.
II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Georgia Power Co. v. Cazier2 (Cazier1) was revisited in 2016 in Cazier
v. Georgia Power Co. 3 (Cazier ll), where the Georgia Court of Appeals
again held that Georgia Power customers were not challenging the
Georgia Public Service Commission's (PSC) decisions or rules, but rather
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1. For an analysis of administrative law during the prior survey period, see Jennifer
B. Alewine, Courtney E. Ferrell & Erin G. Watstein, Administrative Law, Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 68 MERCER L. REV. 59 (2016).
2. 321 Ga. App. 576, 740 S.E.2d 458 (2013).
3. 339 Ga. App. 506, 793 S.E.2d 668 (2016).
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Georgia Power's improper calculations of municipal franchise fees.4 The
customers thus did not have to exhaust their administrative remedies
since they were challenging a private party.5 The court reasoned that
section 46-2-90 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),8
which states companies that do not follow PSC standards are liable to
their customers, "stands in contrast to other provisions of Title 46, which
expressly provide for administrative petitions or hearings." 7 Because the
Fulton County Superior Court ruled that the PSC's rulings defining
terms used to calculate municipal franchise fees were ambiguous and the
customers were required to apply to the PSC to explain these meanings,
the court of appeals vacated and remanded the trial court's decision for a
second time.8
III. DECISIONS BY ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES

In State v. InternationalKeystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.,9
the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the Georgia
Department of Transportation (the Department) for lack of jurisdiction
under the Appellate Practice Act10 due to the Department's failure to
request appellate review." The Keystone Knights filed a complaint
alleging the Department wrongfully denied the group's Adopt-AHighway application based in part on the content of the group's speech.
The Department filed a motion to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity
and challenging the appropriateness of the remedies sought as the
Keystone Knights could have sought judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 12 The Fulton County Superior Court
denied the Department's motion to dismiss, and the Department filed a
notice of appeal with the court of appeals.1 3 After accepting the case on
transfer from the court of appeals for subject-matter jurisdiction, the
supreme court subsequently ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
at 459.
13.

Id. at 506-07, 793 S.E.2d at 669-70.
Id. at 509, 793 S.E.2d at 671.
O.C.G.A. § 46-2-90 (2017).
Cazier I, 339 Ga. App. at 509, 740 S.E.2d at 671.
Id. at 509-10, 740 S.E.2d at 671-72.
299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) (2017).
Int'l Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 392, 788 S.E.2d at 457.
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1-23 (2017); Int'l Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 394, 788 S.E.2d
Int'l Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 396, 788 S.E.2d at 460.
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Department's appeal because the appeal was from a decision of the
superior court reviewing a decision of a state administrative agency. 14
The Appellate Practice Act provides that there is no appeal of right
from the judgment of a superior court reviewing a decision of a state
administrative agency; rather, appellate review must take place by way
of an application for discretionary review.15 In Keystone Knights, the
court provided guidance on how to determine what is a "state
administrative agency" under O.C.G.A § 5-6-35(a), what is an agency
"decision," and what constitutes a review by a superior court of such
agency decision.16 Although no party disputed that the Department was
an administrative agency, the Department argued that its denial of an
Adopt-A-Highway application was not a decision because a decision
refers to a determination that is made by way of a formal adjudicative
procedure.17 The court agreed that a decision under O.C.G.A § 5-6-35(a)
must be adjudicative in nature and be specific and immediate, not
general or prospective in application.1 8 Nevertheless, the court rejected
the Department's argument because court precedents show that a
"decision" does not require formal adjudicative procedures. 19 Although
the court acknowledged that statutory law or due process may require
formal adjudicative procedures, the court held that, for the purposes of
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), 20 "such procedures are not essential to a
'decision."' 21 As applied in Keystone Knights, the court held that the
Department Commissioner's denial of the Adopt-A-Highway application
was a decision of a state administrative agency for the purposes of
O.C.G.A § 5-6-35(a)(1) because the Commissioner had the authority to
speak, act, and make determinations on behalf of the Department. 22
The court also rejected the Department's argument that the superior
court's judgment was not a decision reviewing an agency decision. 23 The
court stated that if a party to a judicial proceeding "attacks or defends
the validity of an administrative ruling and seeks to prevent or promote
the enforcement thereof, the trial court must necessarily 'review' the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 408, 788 S.E.2d at 468.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a).
Int'l Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 399, 788 S.E.2d at 462.
Id.
See id. at 404, 788 S.E.2d at 465.
Id. at 399-400, 788 S.E.2d at 462.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) (2017).
Int'l Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 406, 788 S.E.2d at 466.
Id. at 407, 788 S.E.2d at 467.
Id. at 408, 788 S.E.2d at 468.
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administrative decision [to resolve the merits of the case]." 24 The
Department also argued that the judgment from which it appealed was
not entered in a proceeding under the Administrative Procedures Act or
any statute authorizing judicial review of its denial of the Keystone
Knight's application. 25 In rejecting the State's position, the court held
that when it "consider[s] the nature of the proceedings in the superior
court for the purposes of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1)," it looks to "the substance
of those proceedings, not merely the form of the relief sought." 26
Therefore, "[n]otwithstanding that the proceedings and judgment below
were only for injunctive and declaratory relief, the proceedings and
judgment amounted to a review of a decision to deny a particular AdoptA-Highway application." 27 In conclusion, the court held that, because the
Department appealed a decision of a superior court reviewing a decision
of a state administrative agency, it was required under O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(1) to file an application for discretionary review to seek
appellate review. 28
A few months later, in Wolfe v. Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia,29 the Georgia Supreme Court reiterated the necessity
of filing an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(1) when a party appeals a superior court's affirmation of an
adjudicative agency decision. 30 The president of Georgia Southern
University, Brooks A. Keel, fired Lorne Wolfe, a tenured professor, for
violation of university policies. Following the denial of Wolfe's application
to review his termination by the Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia (Board of Regents), Wolfe filed suit in the Fulton
County Superior Court for breach of contract and mandamus against
President Keel and the Board of Regents seeking reinstatement and
other relief. The superior court granted the motion for summary
judgment filed by the Board of Regents, which Wolfe appealed to the
Georgia Supreme Court.31 To determine whether it had jurisdiction and
whether a discretionary application to appeal was required under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), the court applied the guidance laid out in

24.
58, 564
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 275 Ga. 255, 257S.E.2d 715, 718 (2002)).
Id.
Id. at 407, 788 S.E.2d at 467.
Id. at 408, 788 S.E.2d at 468.
Id.
300 Ga. 223, 794 S.E.2d 85 (2016).
Id. at 226-27, 794 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 223, 794 S.E.2d at 86.
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Keystone Knights to determine whether (i) a state administrative agency,
(ii) made a decision, (iii) that was reviewed by the superior court. 32
The supreme court held that the Board of Regents is a state
administrative agency with statutory authority to discontinue or remove
professors as the good of an institution may require and make rules and
regulations for the performance of its duties. 33 The Board of Regents
exercised its authority when it adopted the standards of conduct and
procedural policies for universities which applies when entering into and
terminating contracts of employment with professors. 34 Next, the court
determined that the Board of Regents made a "decision" in terminating
Wolfe.3 5 Consistent with the holding in Keystone Knights, the decision
was adjudicative in nature rather than executive or legislative because
"it was based on an assessment of the particular facts surrounding a
single person's past conduct, it involved an application of [the] Board [of
Regents'] rules and policies to that conduct, and it had the immediate
and specific consequence of terminating Wolfe's contract." 36
Finally, the court determined the decision of the superior court was
one that reviewed the decision of the Board of Regents. 37 The court
rejected Wolfe's argument that the superior court did not review an
agency decision because it failed to mention the Board of Regents' denial
of Wolfe's application for discretionary review of President Keel's decision
to terminate him. 38 The procedures adopted by the Board of Regents
authorized a university president to terminate a professor's contract. 39
The Board of Regents exercised its discretion not to review President
Keel's decision when it declined Wolfe's application, thereby making his
decision to terminate the operative decision of the agency. 40 Further, the
court reiterated its holding in Keystone Knights that "[i]f a party to a
judicial proceeding 'attacks or defends the validity of an administrative
ruling and seeks to prevent or promote the enforcement thereof, the trial
court must necessarily "review" the administrative decision (to resolve
the merits of the case)."' 41 The court summarized that "Wolfe's complaint
asked the superior court to review a decision of a state administrative
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
299 Ga.

Id. at 227, 794 S.E.2d at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228, 794 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 228, 794 S.E.2d at 89-90.
Id. at 228, 794 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 228-29, 794 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 229, 794 S.E.2d at 90.
Id.
Id. at 230, 794 S.E.2d at 91 (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Keystone Knights,
at 408, 788 S.E.2d at 468).
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agency; the superior court reviewed that decision" and denied relief, and
Wolfe appealed that decision to the supreme court. 42 As a result, Wolfe
was required to file a discretionary application to appeal under O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(1). 43
IV. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
In Bender v. Southtowne Motors of Newnan, Inc.,4 4 the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that where a private right of action is only authorized by
statute, a party's failure to follow the implementing rules and
regulations, but not the statute, does not itself authorize a private right
of action against the offending party. 45 The Benders filed suit claiming
Southtowne Motors violated the Georgia Lemon Law 4 6 by selling them a
car without appropriately disclosing that the car had been reacquired by
the manufacturer due to certain defects. 47 A private right of action under
the Georgia Lemon Law is only available under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-790(a) 48
if a seller of a reacquired vehicle fails to provide clear and conspicuous
written notice to the prospective buyer of the vehicle's reacquisition and
nature of any alleged nonconformity. 4 9 At the time of purchase, the
Benders signed a form stating the car had been repurchased by the
manufacturer due to certain listed defects and nonconformities. The
Benders testified that they briefly reviewed the form, understood that
the car had been repurchased by the manufacturer for defects, signed the
form, and sought confirmation that the defects had been repaired. 5o The
court held the Benders were clearly and conspicuously informed in
writing that the car was reacquired by the manufacturer and the nature
of the defects that led to the reacquisition. 51
Nevertheless, the Benders argued that Southtowne Motors's
disclosure was insufficient and failed to comply with the rules and
regulations which, under the authority of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-795,52 had been
set forth by the attorney general. 53 While the court agreed that these

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 231, 794 S.E.2d at 91.
Id.
339 Ga. App. 439, 793 S.E.2d 618 (2016).
Id. at 447, 793 S.E.2d at 624.
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-780-98 (2017).
Bender, 339 Ga. App. at 439, 793 S.E.2d at 620.
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-790(a) (2017).
Bender, 339 Ga. App. at 443-44, 793 S.E.2d at 622-23.
Id. at 440, 793 S.E.2d at 620-21.
Id. at 445, 793 S.E.2d at 623.
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-795 (2017).
See id.; Bender, 339 Ga. App. at 445, 793 S.E.2d at 624.
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rules and regulations imposed additional requirements on sellers like
Southtowne, it disagreed that the failure to follow them creates a private
right of action not otherwise available under the statute. 54 O.C.G.A. §
10-1-790(a)(1)55 only requires conspicuous written notice, not that such
notice be provided on a particular form or the form be given to the
purchaser within a set amount of time.5 6 The court reiterated that just
because "the statute specifically authorizes the enactment of the rules
and regulations to implement and enforce the provisions of the statute
does not mean this language can be read more expansively than the plain
terms allow."5 7 As a result, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of

summary judgment against the Benders in part, holding that the Georgia
General Assembly did not intend to authorize a buyer's private right of
action under the Georgia Lemon Law and Fair Business Practices Act5 8
against sellers who adhere to the statutory disclosures but simply failed
to comply with the additional requirements imposed by the implementing
rules and regulations.59
In New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Georgia Department of
Revenue,6 0 internet service providers (the Providers) brought suit against
the Georgia Department of Revenue (the Department) for refusing to
refund sales taxes erroneously paid by the Providers' customers for
wireless internet service access. The DeKalb County Superior Court
granted the Department's motion to dismiss, and the Providers appealed.
The Providers challenged the trial court's determination that the
Providers must first refund their customers before seeking a refund from
the Department. 61 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35,62 a taxpayer must be
refunded any and all taxes that are determined to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed and collected. 63 However, the Department's own
regulations require a provider to affirmatively show that the tax had
been refunded to the consumer prior to receiving a refund from the
Department. 64 The Providers argued that the Department's
interpretation of its regulation is not supported by its plain language and

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Bender, 339 Ga. App. at 447, 793 S.E.2d at 624.
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-790(a)(1) (2017).
Bender, 339 Ga. App. at 447, 793 S.E.2d at 625.
Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390-408 (2017).
Bender, 339 Ga. App. at 447, 793 S.E.2d at 625.
340 Ga. App. 316, 797 S.E.2d 190 (2017).
Id. at 316, 797 S.E.2d at 191.
O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35 (2017).
Id.
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 560-12-1-.25(2) (2017).
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is unreasonable.65 The Department enacted this refund procedure
regulation pursuant to its "explicit statutory authority to 'promulgate
regulations for the enforcement of the Public Revenue Code and the
collection of revenues thereunder."' 66 Further, precedent supports
judicial deference afforded to 'the agency's interpretation of rules and
regulations it has enacted to fulfill the function given it by the legislative
branch."' 67 The court held that the Department's interpretation of its
rules and regulations were reasonable and affirmed the trial court's
dismissal because the Providers failed to refund consumers prior to
seeking a refund from the Department.66
In City of Cumming v. Flowers,6 9 the Georgia Supreme Court clarified
that, under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1,70 the appropriate procedure by which a local
zoning board's quasi-judicial decision on a variance request may be
appealed to the superior court is by a petition for certiorari. 71 In doing so,
the court overturned a line of precedent, including Jackson v. Spalding
County,72 to the extent the precedent cases stated it was appropriate to
appeal a quasi-judicial variance decision by mandamus when the local
zoning ordinance does not provide for a petition by certiorari. 73 The City
of Cumming's Board of Zoning Appeals (the Board) granted Kerley
Family Homes, LLC (Kerley) a variance for building townhomes too close
to adjoining property in violation of the city's zoning ordinance.
Neighboring homeowners (Homeowners) harmed by the variance filed a
complaint in the Forsyth County Superior Court against the City of
Cumming, the Board, and members of the Board (the City) seeking a writ
of mandamus to compel the Board to comply with the law and an
injunction to enjoin Kerley from violating the law. The City and Kerley
filed a motion to dismiss that the parties agreed to treat as a motion for
summary judgment. The superior court denied the motion for summary
74
judgment, and the City and Kerley appealed.

65. New Cingular Wireless, 340 Ga. App. at 319, 797 S.E.2d at 193.
66. Id. at 319, 797 S.E.2d at 193-94 (quoting Ga. Dep't of Revenue v. Ga. Chemistry
Council, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 615, 616, 607 S.E.2d 207, 208 (2004)).
67. Id. at 319-20, 797 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting Pruitt Corp. v Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health,
284 Ga. 158, 159, 664 S.E.2d 223, 225 (2008)).
68. Id. at 320, 797 S.E.2d at 194.
69. 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017).
70. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2017).
71. Flowers, 300 Ga. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848.
72. 265 Ga. 792, 462 S.E.2d 361 (1995).
73. Flowers, 300 Ga. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848.
74. Id. at 820-21, 797 S.E.2d at 849.
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O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a) 75 provides that quasi-judicial decisions of local
entities must be appealed by a petition of certiorari. 76 In Jackson, the
supreme court held that a zoning variance decision was quasi-judicial
and subject to certiorari review under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1, but also held that
mandamus is the proper method to appeal a variance decision "[w]hen
the zoning ordinance fails to prescribe a method of judicial review."7 7 In
Flowers, the court determined that the Board made a quasi-judicial
decision in ruling on Kerley's requested variance and considered
"whether the facts applied to a specific piece of property warrant relief
from [the] zoning ordinance."7 8 As such, the Board's quasi-judicial
decision was subject to certiorari review under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1,
prompting the court to reexamine the Jackson line of precedent also
permitting review by mandamus. 79 The court reiterated that "in
conformance with the text of the mandamus statute, 'if there be a specific
remedy by certiorari, the right of mandamus will not lie."'8 0 The court
determined the certiorari-versus-mandamus analysis was straightforward and held the Homeowners' mandamus claim was improper.81
The court then overruled the Jackson line of precedent to the extent
those cases permitted challenge by mandamus because the cases offered
no justification for the exception, were inconsistent in application, and
were based on unsound reasoning. 82 The court interpreted Jackson to
permit a city or county to effectively follow the local ordinance rather
than O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 in deciding how a variance decision must be
appealed. 83 Determining such an outcome contrary to the Georgia
Constitution, which holds general laws are supreme over local
ordinances, the court overruled Jackson and similar cases because they
improperly created means of appeal to. the superior court, including
direct appeals, that are not authorized by statute. 84

75. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a) (2017).
76. Id.
77. Jackson, 265 Ga. at 792-93, 462 S.E.2d at 363.
78. Flowers, 300 Ga. at 823, 797 S.E.2d at 850.
79. Id. at 825, 797 S.E.2d at 851-52.
80. Id. at 825, 797 S.E.2d at 852 (quoting City of Statesboro v. Dickens, 293 Ga. 540,
542, 748 S.E.2d 397, 400 (2013)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 827-28, 831, 797 S.E.2d at 853, 856.
83. Id. at 829, 797 S.E.2d at 854.
84. Id. at 831, 797 S.E.2d at 855.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

24

[Vol. 69

V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

In Inglett & Stubbs International, Ltd. v. Riley, 85 Inglett, an
international electrical contractor based in Smyrna, Georgia, sought a
refund of $1.9 million in sales tax from the Georgia Department of
Revenue (the Department). In connection with several construction and
installation projects for the United States Department of the Army in
Afghanistan, Inglett purchased materials that were delivered and stored
in Smyrna. Despite initially paying the sales tax on these materials,
Inglett subsequently sought a refund from the Department claiming that
it was a "reseller," rather than a "consumer," liable for sales tax under
Georgia law. Inglett appealed after the Department, the Georgia Tax
Tribunal, and the Fulton County Superior Court denied Inglett's refund
in turn. 86
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-30(b)(1) 87 and 48-8-2(31),88 every
purchaser of tangible personal property in Georgia is liable for a 4% sales
tax on the purchase price so long as the sale is for any purpose other than
resale.89 Therefore, whether a purchaser is classified as an end-use
consumer or reseller is critical in assessing sales tax liability. 90 The
Administrative Law Judge for the Tax Tribunal, whom the superior court
affirmed on appeal, found Inglett to be "a consumer liable for sales tax,
rather than a reseller."91 Reviewing the prior decisions de novo, the
Georgia Court of Appeals rejected Inglett's argument that it was a
reseller rather than a retail consumer. 92 As decided by the court of
appeals in J. W. Meadors & Co. v. State,93 sales to contractors are sales to
consumers. 94 Further, as codified in O.C.G.A. § 48-8-63(b), 95 each person
who "contracts to furnish tangible personal property and to perform
services under the contract within this state shall be deemed to be the
consumer .

.

. and shall pay the sales tax imposed by this article at the

time of the purchase." 96 In Inglett, the court held that the contractor-asconsumer rule applied to Inglett because, in carrying out its contractual

339 Ga. App. 375, 791 S.E.2d 642 (2016).
Id. at 375-76, 791 S.E.2d at 643.
O.C.G.A. § 48-8-30(b)(1) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 48-8-2(31) (2017).
O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-30(b)(1), 48-8-2(31).
Inglett, 339 Ga. App. at 377, 791 S.E.2d at 644.
Id. at 376, 791 S.E.2d at 643.
Id. at 377, 791 S.E.2d at 643-44.
89 Ga. App. 583, 80 S.E.2d 86 (1954).
Id. at 584, 80 S.E.2d at 87.
95. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-63(b) (2017).
96. Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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responsibilities, Inglett performed work and services in Georgia by
purchasing and storing property in the state. 9
VI. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

In a strong recognition of the authority of final decisions made by state
agencies, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Tanner Medical Center,
Inc. v. Vest Newnan, LLC,98 that its duty is not to consider whether the
record supports the trial court's decision, but instead whether the record
supports the agency's decision. 99 In Tanner, the Department of
Community Health (DCH) denied Vest Newnan a certificate of need to
establish an inpatient psychiatric hospital. 100 A certificate of need is
required by statute 01 and the program for acquiring a certificate of need
is overseen by the DCH and granted based on several factors, including
area population and use of existing services. 102 The court of appeals
previously stated that "[t]he DCH rules promulgated to administer the
[certificate of need] program are detailed and lengthy" and that
administrative review is highly specialized.103 In Tanner, Vest Newnan
was denied a certificate of need and "appealed DCH's denial with Coweta
County and the City of Newnan intervening in the action on [Vest
Newnan's] behalf." 104 The hearing officer affirmed the DCH's denial after
a de novo administrative hearing, holding Vest Newnan did not show a
need for a new psychiatric inpatient program, and such a service "would
constitute an unnecessary duplication of services, would have an
unreasonable effect on payors, [and] would not foster improvements or
innovations" among other issues.105 Vest Newnan appealed to the DCH
Commissioner who affirmed the hearing officer's decision and adopted it
as a final order. 106 Vest Newnan and the City petitioned for judicial
review and the Coweta County Superior Court reversed the DCH's
decision, concluding "that the service-specific
need rule is
unconstitutional on its face, and that the 'adverse impact' and
'relationship to the delivery system analysis' rests upon the

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
S.E.2d
103.
104.
105.
106.

339 Ga. App. at 378-79, 791 S.E.2d at 645.
337 Ga. App. 884, 789 S.E.2d 258 (2016).
Id. at 887, 789 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 884, 789 S.E.2d at 259-60.
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40(a)(1) (2017).
See Palmyra Park Hosp. v. Phoebe Sumter Med. Ctr., 310 Ga. App. 487, 488, 714
71, 73 (2011).
Id. at 491-92, 714 S.E.2d at 75.
Tanner, 337 Ga. App. at 886, 789 S.E.2d at 260.
Id. at 886, 789 S.E.2d at 261.
Id.
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Coweta

County

Superior Court further held "that the manner in which DCH reviewed
Vest's application was arbitrary and capricious because the [initial] DCH
reviewer did not take notes during his review or perform any need or
adverse impact analysis.10 8
The court of appeals first held that it would not apply a de novo
standard of review, but instead would determine "whether 'substantial
evidence' supports the agency's findings of fact, and whether the
conclusions of law drawn from those findings of fact are sound."109 The
court then evaluated whether the DCH had reviewed Vest Newnan's
application in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 110 The court
determined there was "no requirement in the statutory framework of the
[certificate of need] program or elsewhere in the DCH rules requiring the
reviewer to take notes or perform his own need and adverse impact
analysis."111 Thus, the trial court "erred in concluding that the procedure
employed by DCH was arbitrary and capricious on this ground." 112 The
court further held the DCH had complied with its own procedures in
requiring additional
information
regarding architectural
and
construction costs, and that Vest Newnan was given the opportunity to
submit such requested information, resulting in another error where the
trial court found DCH had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 113
Finally, the court held that where a certificate of need applicant fails
to establish no adverse impact on other regional service providers, the
application may be denied by the DCH and should not be overruled by a
reviewing court.114 The court's duty is not to consider whether the record
supports the trial court's decision, but instead whether the record
supports the agency's decision. 115 Vest Newnan's application had a
projected patient volume that was largely dependent on the redirection
of admissions from existing providers to attain its projected level of
utilization, which would have an adverse impact on other existing service

107. Id.
108. Id. at 886-87, 789 S.E.2d at 261.
109. Id. at 887, 789 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Palmyra Park Hosp., 310 Ga. App. at 488,
714 S.E.2d at 72).
110. Id. at 889, 789 S.E.2d at 262.
111. Id. at 889, 789 S.E.2d at 263.
112. Id. at 890, 789 S.E.2d at 263.
113. Id. at 890-91, 789 S.E.2d at 263.
114. Id. at 893, 789 S.E.2d at 265.
115. Id.
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providers.11 6 The court held the decision was not arbitrary and capricious
because the DCH's decision was rational. 117
In another certificate of need case, Medical Center of Central Georgia
v. Hospital Authority of Monroe County,118 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that where an agency has discretion to initiate investigations of
possible violations of statutes or agency rules, and declines to do so, a
reviewing court cannot order such an investigation. 119 In this case, the
Medical Center of Central Georgia (MCCG) submitted a letter of nonrenewability request (LNR) to the DCH seeking determination that its
acquisition of certain medical equipment in an off-campus medical
facility did not require a certificate of need. The Hospital Authority of
Monroe County (MCH) objected to MCCG's request, and asked the DCH
to perform an investigation. However, the DCH granted the LNR to
MCCG, finding that the equipment was for hospital use. MCH requested
a hearing, and MCCG moved for and was granted summary judgment
because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
proposed equipment purchase was for use in a hospital. MCH requested
a review of the decision, but the DCH Commissioner affirmed the
decision that MCCG did not need a certificate of need. The Monroe
County Superior Court then reversed the DCH's decision, concluding the
DCH exceeded its statutory authority, abused its discretion by not
conducting an investigation, and ordered an investigation. 120
The court of appeals noted that the DCH is authorized to administer
Georgia's certificate of need program and held that O.C.G.A. § 31-6-45121
gives the DCH discretion to make public or private investigations to
determine whether provisions of that program have been violated. 122
Moreover, the court noted that O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1123 only allows
superior courts to affirm, remand, reverse, or modify the final decision of
an agency. 124 Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the superior court's
decision requiring the DCH to perform an investigation into MCH's
allegations against MCCG.125

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 892-93, 789 S.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 890-91, 893, 789 S.E.2d at 263, 265.
340 Ga. App. 499, 798 S.E.2d 42 (2017).
Id. at 507, 798 S.E.2d at 49.
Id. at 501-03, 798 S.E.2d at 45-47.
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-45 (2017).
Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., 340 Ga. App. at 507, 798 S.E.2d at 49.
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1 (2017).
Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., 340 Ga. App. at 507, 798 S.E.2d at 49.
Id.
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Finally, in Kennestone Hospital, Inc. v. Cartersville Medical Center,
Inc., 126 the Georgia Court of Appeals again evaluated the DCH's final
decision to award a certificate of need. 127 In Kennestone, the court
reiterated the importance of ruling within the timelines established by
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1, which requires the court reviewing the DCH's
decision to hear the case within 120 days of the filing of the case unless
the hearing has been continued, and then within 30 days after the
continued hearing. 128 The court held that, because the superior court did
not enter its order within the required time, the DCH's decision to grant
the certificate of need stands.129

In Cherokee County Board of Tax Assessors v. Mason,130 the Georgia

Court of Appeals evaluated an appeal to renew a Conservation Use
Valuation Assessment (CUVA).1 3 1 Milford Mason applied for and
obtained a CUVA in 1993 and 2003. However, Mason's 2013 application
for renewal of the CUVA was denied by the Cherokee County Board of
Tax Assessors (the Board) under the reasoning that Mason had no timber
management plan, did not continuously and actively manage his poplar
stands, and owned a rental house on the lot. Mason sought review of the
Board's decision in the Crawford County Superior Court, which
conducted a de novo review, reversed the Board's decision, and
determined Mason was entitled to a CUVA.13 2 On the Board's first
appeal, the court of appeals remanded the case because the superior court
did not use the factors set forth in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4133 to determine if
his property was eligible for renewal. 134 The superior court again
determined that Mason was eligible, the Board appealed for a second
135
time, and the court of appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.
The court noted that the superior court did not consider all the factors in
determining whether Mason was entitled to a CUVA; because the list
was non-exhaustive, the superior court's decision was affirmed. 136

In Welcker v. Georgia Board of Examiners of Psychologists,137 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that where an administrative agency's
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

341 Ga. App. 28, 798 S.E.2d 381 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 30, 798 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at 32, 798 S.E.2d at 384.
340 Ga. App. 889, 798 S.E.2d 32 (2017).
Id. at 889, 798 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 891-92, 798 S.E.2d at 34-36.
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4 (2017).
Mason, 340 Ga. App. at 891, 798 S.E.2d at 34-35.
Id. at 889-92, 798 S.E.2d at 34-36.
Id. at 893, 798 S.E.2d at 36.
340 Ga. App. 853, 798 S.E.2d 368 (2017).

2017]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

29

construction of its own rule is not plainly erroneous based on the plain
language of the rule, the court must defer to the agency's
interpretation.1 38 In that case, the court upheld the Georgia Board of
Examiners of Psychologists' denial of an application for a license to
practice psychology due to failure to satisfy a residency requirement
because courts must defer to an agency's interpretation and application
of its own rules.1 39 The court also held that the agency's decision cannot
be overturned based on an abuse of discretion if there is some evidence
to support the agency's application of the rule.14 0 Furthermore, if no
administrative hearing is required by law, then there is no contested case
that is subject to judicial review.141 The court also noted that a waiver
may only be granted if denying a license would cause substantial
hardship, which is defined by O.C.G.A. § 50-13-9.1(b)(1)14 2 as
significantly impairing the ability of the applicant to continue to function
in the regulated practice.1 43
Judge Miller, joined by Judge Reese, dissented to the majority's
opinion, stating that the Board's current interpretation of its rule was
not in effect at the time the individual became subject to the Board's rules
or even began her education.1 44 Judge Miller thus concluded that the
individual was entitled to her license.1 45 Judge McFadden, joined by
Judge Reese, also dissented, and held that the individual "made a prima
facie showing of substantial hardship" and good faith to avoid the
hardship.1 46 Judge McFadden stated he believed incurring substantial
debt qualified as substantial hardship and, therefore, the license should
be granted. 147
VII. RECENT LEGISLATION

This survey period saw a consistent number of enactments with major
changes to administrative agencies during the Georgia General
Assembly's regular session. The following are the more prominent
measures that have been enacted:

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 854, 798 S.E.2d at 370.
Id. at 859, 798 S.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 855, 798 S.E.2d at 371.
Id. at 856, 798 S.E.2d at 371.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-9.1(b)(1) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-9.1(b)(1); Welcker, 340 Ga. App. at 860, 798 S.E.2d at 374.
Welcker, 340 Ga. App. at 861-62, 798 S.E.2d at 374-75 (Miller, J., dissenting).

145. Id. at 862, 798 S.E.2d at 375.
146. Id. at 862-63, 798 S.E.2d at 375 (McFadden, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 863-64, 798 S.E.2d at 376.
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1) Last year's more controversial Judicial Qualifications Commission
was revisited with the creation of "The Judicial Qualifications
Commission Improvement Act of 2017," which substantially revises
matters in connection with the Commission.148
2) "The First Priority Act-Helping Turnaround Schools Puts
Students First" Act was created to provide for a system of supports and
assistance for the lowest-performing schools identified as in the greatest
need of assistance.14 9
3) The former Agricultural Education Advisory Commission has been
recreated.150

4) The Commissioner of Agriculture may now issue a variance or
waiver to certain rules and regulations of the Department of
Agriculture. 15 1
5) The Office of Cardiac Care has been established within the
Department of Public Health.152
6) The State Road and Tollway Authority is now allowed to enter into
credit enhancement or liquidity agreements with private entities to allow
for funding for road projects through issuance of bonds.1 53
7) The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security
Agency is required to establish a state-wide system to facilitate the
transport and distribution of essentials in commerce during a state of
emergency declared by the Governor. 154
8) The Council on American Indian Concerns is now attached to the
Department of Natural Resources for administrative purposes. 155
9) The Georgia Geospatial Advisory Council has been recreated. 156
10) The definition of "agency" has been expanded for purposes relating
to the Georgia Technology Authority, and the Act provides for the
148. Ga. H.R. Bill 126, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 157 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 15-1-21,
15-9-2.1 (2017)).
149. Ga. H.R. Bill 338, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 75 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-73,
20-2-83, 20-2-2063.20-2, 20-2-2067.1, 20-14-41, 14-43-49.4 (2017)).
150. Ga. H.R. Bill 437, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 111 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-14-90
(2017)).
151. Ga. S. Bill 78, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 619 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 26-2-34 (2017)).
152. Ga. S. Bill 102, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 302 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 31-11-130139 (2017)).
153. Ga. S. Bill 183, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 760 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 32-10-60, 3210-63, 32-10-65.2, 32-10-68, 32-10-73, 32-10-107 (2017).
154. Ga. H.R. Bill 405, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 740 (codified at O.C.G.A § 38-3-58
(2017)).
155. Ga. H.R. Bill 153, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 212 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-12-280
(2017)).
156. Ga. H.R. Bill 183, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 216 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-8-30001 (2017)).
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establishment of standard technology policies by the authority to be used
by all agencies unless waived.157

157. Ga. S. Bill 117, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 467 (codified at O.C.G.A.
25-4 (2017)).

§§

50-25-1, 50-
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